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Another argument against moral relativism is that the position is self-refuting. This means that when it is tested against its own criteria, it fails to pass. If I were to write “I cannot write a word in English,” the statement would be self-refuting because I had just written the statement in English. Likewise, the claim of the moral relativist refutes itself. If the moral relativist states “there is no absolute morality,” he just made an absolute statement about morality which, by his own definition he is not allowed to do.
Here, however, the moral relativist may interject and make the claim that, because the statement itself, “There is no absolute morality,” is not a moral statement, it is not self-refuting. But, even if the statement is not a moral statement, surely the implication that the moral relativist draws from the statement refutes itself. Since the moral relativist does not believe that any culture’s morality has any more value than another’s, he also believes that each culture should tolerate every other culture. The view generally takes the following shape: “Since I cannot know that my culture’s morality is correct, I (morally) ought to tolerate the morality of other cultures.” But here appears a non-refutable self-refuting moral statement. What if another culture exists that does not share the same value of tolerance? How would the moral relativist seek to remedy such a dilemma? Whose version of morality would he call on to solve this issue? Does he use his own morality or that of the other culture? The moral relativist’s own belief system forbids him to judge the moral belief system of the other culture based on his own moral belief system and thus forbids him from making his original statement about tolerance. He thus cannot fault the other culture for not valuing tolerance just because he does so. Consequently, the other culture has no moral obligation to value tolerance and the moral relativist has no moral basis for making his statement. The position of the moral relativist again fails in its practical application.
I’m impressed that you pointed out the objection that “there is no absolute morality” is not a moral statement. Most people consider the argument closed before they develop it that far.
However, I don’t agree that relativism itself prescribes tolerance. Many relativists would prescribe tolerance, and I personally strive to be understanding of different people, but I would *not* say that any objective standards would require you to be tolerant.
Relativism also does *not* forbid anyone from making any statements, it just prevents us (relativists) from considering some statements as universal. I can disagree with, vote against, or even prescribe anything I fancy without contradicting a relativist belief set. The only thing I can’t do is expect my disagreement, vote, or prescription to stand on its own without being backed up by a concrete, morality-free argument.
I could, for instance, say “killing babies is wrong”, but the actual meaning I attach to that statement (”God says don’t do it”, “I want our legal system to prevent it”…), as well as the implications of that statement (”I will physically interfere if you try to do it”, “I will report you to the authorities if I know you’ve done it”…) might depend on the context (”God told Abraham to sacrifice Isaac”, “this baby will murder 600 people if it lives”…).